Base Krigan and the Logic of Nazi Peripheral Infrastructure

By Adelio Debenedetti — an exploration of Grey Zones, where power operates beyond formal maps, official archives, and declared conflict.

Natural coastal formations along the Scottish shoreline, offering sheltered access points compatible with submarine operations and peripheral naval logic.

Source: Public Domain / CC BY-SA

Methodological Note

This article starts from a clear position: Base Krigan does not exist as an officially documented facility. No declassified map, no administrative record, no unambiguous archival reference confirms it.

Yet in military history—especially naval warfare—absence of documentation does not automatically imply absence of intent. Peripheral projects, provisional infrastructure, and contingency planning often disappear precisely because they were never designed to be permanent or formally recorded. This article operates within that analytical gap.

On the Origin of the Name “Krigan”

The name “Krigan” does not originate from historical archives. It emerges instead from a more recent stratification of geopolitical and diplomatic narratives, where plausible but unattributed labels are used to denote sensitive or unlocatable infrastructure.

In this sense, Krigan is neither a historical source nor an archival reference. It functions as a signal: a name that circulates because it corresponds to a coherent strategic function, despite remaining unsupported by documentary evidence. Its persistence is not proof of existence, but an indicator of conceptual utility—filling a void left by fragmented archives and non-conventional planning.

Within the framework of the Grey Zones Manifesto, “Krigan” does not designate a place. It designates an analytical function. It allows us to isolate a space where verifiable technical constraints intersect with the absence of formal documentation.

1) The Technical Constraint That Changes Everything: U-Boat Range and Logistics

Germany fought the Battle of the Atlantic with submarines that had significant—but finite—operational autonomy:

• Type VII U-boats (the backbone of the fleet): approximately 6,500–8,500 nautical miles at economical speed.

• Type IX U-boats (long-range): up to 13,000–15,000 nautical miles, designed for extended Atlantic patrols.

These figures matter because range alone does not equal operational sustainability. Long patrols required:

• continuous maintenance;

• rapid repair after combat or mechanical stress;

• resupply of fuel, torpedoes, and provisions;

• temporary shelters to evade Allied anti-submarine warfare.

The famous wolfpack doctrine was not only tactical—it was fundamentally logistical.

(Note: “sea wolves” is a traditional maritime expression for veteran sailors; the operational term used by the Kriegsmarine was Rudeltaktik / wolfpack, and crews were referred to as U-boat personnel.)

Without dispersed support points, attrition would inevitably outweigh any theoretical range advantage.

Captured German U-boats (Type VII and Type IX) outside their submarine pen at Trondheim, Norway, May 1945 — illustrating the physical scale and logistics of Kriegsmarine coastal infrastructure even far from central bases

Source: Wikimedia Commons

2) Strategic Intent: Sinking American Shipping

By 1941–1943, the German objective was explicit: interdict American shipping before it could decisively tip the balance in Europe. That meant:

• long-duration patrols in the North Atlantic;

• operations increasingly close to transatlantic convoy lanes;

• sustained pressure on crews and platforms far beyond peacetime limits.

This generated a structural requirement for forward logistical thinking. Not large bases—those were too visible—but flexible, low-profile support concepts capable of shortening exposure and extending operational cycles.

Strategic depiction of the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap — the North Atlantic maritime chokepoint that influenced submarine and anti-submarine naval planning in WWII and the Cold War.

Source: Wikimedia Commons

3) Peripheral Infrastructure: Why Scotland Mattered

Late-war German naval planning increasingly favored peripheral infrastructure over centralized ports. In that framework, the Scottish coastline was strategically evident:

• proximity to Atlantic convoy routes;

• deep waters compatible with submarine operations;

• rugged, fragmented coastlines difficult to monitor continuously.

This does not imply the construction of a classical “base.” Rather, it suggests a zone of logistical possibility—temporary shelters, emergency anchorages, observation points, or contingency planning.

Seen this way, “Krigan” is best understood as a functional hypothesis, not a mapped location.

4) Norwegian Studies and Westward Projection

Occupied Norway functioned as Germany’s advanced naval laboratory:

• oceanographic research;

• cold-water navigation trials;

• experimentation with extended submarine operations.

From these studies emerged a broader Atlantic logic. German planners thought westward, beyond Norway itself. Scotland fit naturally into this conceptual map—not as a destination, but as a potential operational interface between the North Sea and the wider Atlantic.

Again, no proof of execution exists. What exists is strategic coherence.

Interior view of a WWII submarine pen with U-boats inside — illustrates the sheltered logistical spaces required to maintain underwater fleets.

Source: Imperial War Museums archive via Wikimedia

5) Operation Lobster: Proof of Penetrability

The German infiltration effort known as Operation Lobster, conducted on Scottish soil, adds an important layer. Although the operation failed, it demonstrated that:

• Scotland was considered operationally relevant, not marginal;

• terrain, population, and infrastructure were actively assessed;

• German intelligence was testing accessibility, not merely collecting information.

Human infiltration aligns logically with broader contingency planning, including logistical and naval considerations.

6) The Archival Problem: Allied Seizure and Fragmentation

At the end of the war, Kriegsmarine archives were systematically seized and divided:

• the United States absorbed the largest share;

• the United Kingdom retained materials tied to its operational theaters;

• other portions were distributed to France and the Soviet Union.

Projects deemed non-standard, incomplete, or experimental were often:

• reclassified;

• absorbed into postwar research programs;

• or fragmented beyond reconstruction.

It is therefore plausible that German files concerning peripheral Atlantic infrastructure survived only as unattributed components within Allied archives—particularly American ones—without retaining their original operational identifiers.

7) Why Base Krigan Doesn’t Exist—and Why It Still Matters

The conclusion remains deliberately restrained:

1. Base Krigan does not exist as a documented military installation.

2. The technical and strategic necessity behind it is historically sound.

Submarine range limits, the wolfpack doctrine, the objective of sinking American shipping, the emphasis on peripheral infrastructure, and the postwar handling of archives converge toward a single insight:

Krigan is not a place. Krigan is a function.

A name that emerges from missing files, logistical necessity, and the long shadow cast by Atlantic warfare into the Cold War.

This article does not claim discovery. It defines an analytical space—one where military logic, incomplete archives, and geopolitics overlap.That space is the foundation of the Grey Zones Manifesto. This is where Grey Zones begin: not in what can be proven, but in what strategic logic makes necessary.

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